The True "Insurrectionists"

The True "Insurrectionists"

The sonido of their grand pronouncements,
that "insurrectionist invasion",
it is but a hollow drumbeat
against the red earth,
but resonant
in their echo chambers.

For the truth,
woven into the very fabric
of the suffering land
and the enduring spirit,
is this:
they are the true
"insurrectionists" against
the essential spirit
of communal dignity].

They tear down,
not through overt violence,
but through violence
of the insidious weave of "legal fictions"—
masks crafted
from abstract norms
and dispassionate logic.

Betting on the inculcated
nostalgia of “Law and Order”,
drilled by the multiplicity SVU episodes,
designed to hide
the "disabling of the people"
and the "massacre"
of human worth
behind a veil of
"false assertion[s]
of the privileged kind".

Their "law"
is a performance of power,
a "deliberate distortion of reality"
that twists justice
into a weapon
against the vulnerable.

But the "inherent creativity"
of true jurisprudence,
born of "singularities"
and "concrete situations",
will not be silenced.

It will
"make legal discourse stutter",
revealing the bare,
unforgiving truth
of their calculated cruelty.

They shriek
of "insurrectionist invasion",
cloaking their cruel deeds
in the shimmering
garments of "legality."

But even in their own texts,
the very stones
of their doctrine
betray them.

Kelsen,
the meticulous cartographer
of norms,
speaks of the stark,
unbridgeable chasm
between "Is" and "Ought".

He instructs us
that the validity
of a legal norm
is fiercely independent
of its moral content.

A judicial decision,
even one that
aligns not at all
with a moral norm
or a supposed norm
of Natural Law,
remains valid
if its creation adheres
to the prescribed
genealogical precedent
of legal process.

To blur the boundary
between positive law
and morality, or politics,
is to "deprive
[the concept of law]
of any firm boundary",
a confusion
that serves
only those
who would subjectively
"justify or question
its validity on moral
or political grounds"
under the pretense
of objective legal cognition.

Carl Schmitt, too,
reveals this chilling detachment,
noting that a system of legality
can devolve into "a formalism
and functionalism
without substance
or reference points,"
allowing for actions
"strictly legal"
that are,
in truth,
a "coup d'etat".

Such a system,
in its "unconditional,
neutral functionalism,"
is indifferent
to "substantive values,"
even those it ostensibly protects.

This "value neutrality"
can be pushed
to the extreme
of "system suicide,"
where anything passed is legal
"without regard to content
and political significance".

Deleuze,
in his relentless pursuit
of "the concrete,"
would scoff
at the "hazy abstractions
and oppressive transcendences"
invoked by such a discourse
on human rights,
seeing in them
"real obstacle[s]
to the functioning
of the constructive system",
reducing the migrant,
the gente de color,
to a mere abstraction
outside the embrace
of concrete, situated justice.

Don’t be deceived
by their claims
to reason or truth.
Kelsen vehemently insists
that a norm,
being the "meaning of an act of will,"
"cannot be subject to the rules of logic".

There is no logical inference
from a general norm
to an individual judicial decision,
for discretion always exists.

He rejects the very notion
of a distinct
"juristic logic".

Their supposed "truth"
is not the property
of a factual statement,
for legal norms are prescriptions,
not descriptions,
and are therefore
"neither true nor false".

When they employ
"legal fictions,"
they are utilizing
a "false assertion of the privileged kind",
a device "propounded with a complete
or partial consciousness of its falsity"
yet "acted upon, as if true".

These are not transparent truths,
but rather strategic
"re-description[s] of facts"
to achieve a desired,
often hidden, outcome.